This paper reviews changes in the federal government's approach to antipoverty policy, analyzes the trend in child poverty and the antipoverty impacts of current income maintenance programs, and proposes some additional antipoverty policies.
INTRODUCTION
The planners of the War on Poverty and Great Society programs assumed that active government policies implemented in a full-employment, growing economy would virtually eliminate income poverty, as officially measured, by 1980. According to Lampman (1971) While income poverty is a relative matter, I do not think we should engage in frequent changes of the poverty lines, other than to adjust for price changes. As I see it, the elimination of income poverty is usefully thought of as a one-time operation in pursuit of a goal unique to this generation. That goal should be achieved before 1980, at which time the next generation will have set new economic and social goals, perhaps including a new distributional goal for themselves (p. 53).
And poverty did decline, from 19.0 percent of all persons in 1964 to 11.1 percent in 1973, as both social spending and the economy boomed.
The decade 1970-1979 was a period of continued growth in social welfare spending, as these planners intended, but a period of unexpectedly disappointing economic performance. Productivity and economic growth slowed, family income stagnated, and prices and unemployment rose.
Given these conditions, the fact that poverty was virtually constant for most of the 1970s can be viewed as an indication that antipoverty policies were successful in offsetting economic adversity (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1985a) .
The official perspective of the early 1980s, evident in the federal budgetary retrenchment in social spending, however, was quite different.
Antipoverty programs themselves were blamed for the failure of poverty to fall during the 1970s as it had during the 1950s and 1960s (Murray, 1984) . According to President Reagan:
With the coming of the Great Society, government began eating away at the underpinnings of the private enterprise system. The big taxers and big spenders in the Congress had started a binge that would slowly change the nature of our society and, even worse, it threatened the character of our people. . . .
By the time the full weight of Great Society programs was felt, economic progress for America's poor had come to a tragic halt. (Remarks before the National Black Republican Council, September 15, 1982) In 1964, the famous War on Poverty was declared. And a funny thing happened. Poverty, as measured by dependency, stopped shrinking and then actually began to grow worse. I guess you could say, "Poverty won the War." Poverty won, in part, because instead of helping the poor, government programs ruptured the bonds holding poor families together. (Radio address, February 15, 1986) The "Reagan Experiment" assumed that if government avoided active interventions in a wide range of domestic policy areas, productivity and economic growth could be increased, and prices, unemployment, and poverty could be reduced. According to Irving Kristol (1984) , "The administration's social policy cannot be understood apart from its economic policy--which is a policy of growth not redistribution."
The evidence from the "Reagan Experiment" is now in. Poverty has fallen somewhat each year since 1983, a year marked by the highest unemployment rate since the Great Depression and the highest poverty rate, 15.2 percent, since the late 1960s. But, at about 13 percent in 1988, poverty remains well above the rate of 1979, the last businesscycle peak. This modest decline occurred during an unusually long economic recovery, but one characterized by relatively constant social spending.
This recent experience demonstrates that economic growth on its own cannot significantly reduce child poverty in the United States. percentage points--from 21.8 to 19.8--between 1983 and 1988 . If the current recovery were to somehow continue until 1998, and if child poverty kept falling at this same rate of 2 percentage points every five years, then the child poverty rate in 1998 would be 15.8 percent--what it was in 1976! A more formal projection of the poverty rate for all persons, based on time-series regressions in which the official poverty rate for all persons is modeled as a function of Congressional Budget Office forecasts of unemployment rates and economic growth suggests that even if the current economic recovery continues until the end of the decade, poverty for all persons will decline from 13.5 percent in 1987, but only to the levels of the late 1970s, about 12 percent (see Danziger and Gottschalk, 1985b , for a discussion of the regression model).
The economic and policy history of the past two decades demonstrates that if poverty is to be "virtually eliminated" before the turn of the century, we must launch a comprehensive antipoverty effort that builds on what we have learned about who remains poor and about which policies have worked and which have not. There are some signs in academic and policy discussions that a "new consensus" (Novak et al., 1987) on the nature of poverty and the means for reducing it has emerged. Most analysts and policymakers now avoid the simple statements that characterized the antipoverty policy debates of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Those debates typically viewed the poor either, on the one hand, as victims of their own inadequacies, often mired in a culture of poverty, or, on the other, as victims of societal deficiencies such as inadequate schooling, lack of labor market opportunities, and discrimination. Now there is an appreciation of the diversity of the poverty population--an awareness that the polar views of individual inadequacies and societal inequities each apply to only a small portion of the poverty population. The poverty problem of the elderly widow differs from that of the family whose head seeks full-time work but finds only sporadic employment; the poverty of the family head who works full time but at low wages differs from that of the family head who receives welfare and either cannot find a job or does not find it profitable to seek work.
According to this new consensus, which emerged in the late 1980s, only the poverty of those not expected to work, such as the elderly and the disabled, should be addressed with expanded welfare benefits (see, for example, Ellwood, 1987 
WHO RECEIVES AID AND WHO REMAINS POOR?
In the past several years, much attention has been focused on the declining poverty rates of the elderly and the growing poverty among In part, because of these very diverse trends in poverty and social spending for children and the elderly, popular discussions often derive misleading policy implications. The most common (misleading) conclusion is that government policy has aided the elderly to the detriment of the young, so that spending on the elderly should be reduced and these funds should be used to increase spending on children. An examination of the historical record and of the diversity of children and the elderly reveals that this conclusion is misguided (see Smolensky, Danziger, and Gottschalk, 1988) . There is now greater variation in economic status among children and among the elderly--for example, when they are classified by sex and race--than there is between the age groups.
Many children are much better off than are some of the elderly. As a result, it is unwise to replace one incorrect stylized fact--that the elderly are needy--with another--that children are needy.
Consider this example. It makes little sense to shift spending away from the elderly and toward children if it means eliminating cost-of-living increases in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, which aids the elderly poor, and raising the maximum dependent care tax credit for families with two working spouses, which aids mostly nonpoor children. However, I consider it appropriate to count as taxable income the federal subsidy to Part B of Medicare (the supplementary medical insurance portion), as this would tax only the well-to-do elderly, and to use the revenues thus raised to expand the earned income tax credit, which aids only working-poor and near-poor families with children.
Poverty in the mid-1980s remains very high for many demographic groups. To remedy this situation requires a refocused antipoverty effort, one in which the significance of age is small. If the resources devoted to such an antipoverty effort are appropriately targeted on all of those in need, then children will gain disproportionately and those among the elderly who remain at risk for poverty--widows and members of minority groups--will not be harmed. But with only these facts, one is at a loss as to the appropriate policy response. The increased percentage of children living in mother-only families, for example, might have been due to adverse economic conditions that reduced the ability of black males to support their children. In this case, the disaggregated trends mask a selectivity problem--because of external economic dislocations, jobless males either abandon their children or do not marry in the first place.
THE SPECIAL CASE OF CHILDREN I N POVERTY
To account for this selective response to economic conditions, one should adjust upward the later-year poverty rates for children living in husband-wife families to correct for the missing two-parent families.
Then stability in the child poverty rate would be the correct interpretation and the policy response should focus on economic factors and the reduction of male joblessness (Wilson, 1987) . If sufficient jobs were not available in the private sector or provided by the public sector, then redistributive policies to increase family incomes would be required.
On the other hand, some analysts subscribe to an alternative view that attributes the rise in children living in mother-only families to moral and behavioral deficiencies, and male irresponsibility.
Jobs are available, according to proponents of this view, but "the jobless are shielded from a need to urgently seek work by government benefits, or by the earnings of other family members" (Mead, 1988, pp. 51-52). The decline in child poverty among black children in two-parent families attests to the decline in discrimination in labor markets and shows that if parents would stay married and stay in the labor force, then the poverty problem would continue to abate as it did in the 1949-1969 period. Under this scenario, the recent rise in child poverty is attributed not to economic problems but to attitudinal and family problems. The remedy requires moral suasion, a reduction in the availability of welfare, and the enforcement of work and child support obligations (Novak et al., 1987) .
Of course, while no one believes that either of these polar views provides a complete explanation fir the observed trends in child poverty and living arrangements, some less extreme variation of each could account for some part of the observed changes in poverty.
Unfortunately, no one has yet modeled the determinants of child poverty and living arrangements in such a way as to decompose the trends into a set of demographic, economic, and policy factors. This is because it is clear that there are complex interrelationships among work behavior, welfare recipiency, marriage, and fertility decisions.
Given the caveat that we can describe the situation of children in poverty even though we do not yet have a complete understanding of its causes, Table 2 The data in Table 3 where the head worked somewhat fewer weeks and tended to receive chiefly welfare transfers; these transfers ranged from $4500 to $6000 for the three racial-ethnic groups. Heads of these families--especially among blacks--worked the least of any of the groups shown in the first four columns. Because both labor force attachment and welfare benefits were low, they remained poor despite almost universal welfare recipiency.
Data by sex of family head are not shown in Table 3 . However, as Figure 1 revealed, children living in female-headed families were much more likely to be left in poverty than those in male-headed families.
To sum up, the current system of welfare and nonwelfare transfers provides some aid to more than three-quarters of all pretransfer poor children (last row of Table 3 
FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE 1990s
For most white children, poverty lasts only a few years. But many minority children spend their entire childhood in poverty (Ellwood, 1987) . They live in segregated neighborhoods, isolated from mainstream institutions, in families that lack the income necessary to provide them with sufficient nutrition and health care, and they attend urban schools that offer few opportunities to learn and to escape from poverty. To states. This bill embodies the new consensus in that it redirects welfare policy for the nonworking poor. It neither sets a national minimum welfare benefit nor raises benefits. Rather, it extends the AFDC program for unemployed two-parent families but adds a requirement that at least one of the parents engage in community service in return for benefits. The Act and the state programs now in operation target long-term welfare recipients of working age who have no disabilities but who do not work under the current system (the parents of those children listed in column 3 of Table 3 ). Their (implicit) goal is to turn a welfare check into a paycheck--even if, at first, the total amount of the check is unchanged. Once recipients are at work, it is hoped that they can leave welfare through a combination of increased child support and access to transitional child care, health care, and employment and training services.
Most current work-welfare programs merely replace welfare benefits with an equivalent amount of earnings and limit the number of work opportunities in order to hold down total program costs. Typically, they set the hours to be worked by dividing the welfare benefit by the minimum wage. By allowing recipients to work full time instead and by increasing the number of recipients who participate, they would enhance opportunities for recipients to escape poverty as well as welfare dependency.
If these programs, as currently structured, succeed in transforming nonworking, poor welfare recipients into the working poor, then they represent a necessary first component of a renewed antipoverty agenda.
But such an effort must also address the diverse needs of the millions of poor and near-poor families who receive little or no welfare.
I now turn to some other antipoverty reforms targeted on poor families with children that avoid the expansion of welfare for the able-bodied. (Lerman, 1988 , discusses a similar range of proposals.)
While these reforms could easily cost tens of billions of dollars, they do not involve a simple expansion of existing programs. Rather, as described by Isabel Sawhill (1988) , such a set of proposals is built on the assumptions that parents must take greater responsibility for their children--through increased work by mothers heading single-parent families and through increased child support by the absent fathers--and that the public sector must offer more employment and education opportunities so that the poor from whom we have come to expect greater responsibility will have the means to transform their efforts into higher incomes.
My proposals could be financed in part through higher taxes on the nonpoor. Tax policy has recently shifted in this direction, for example, by eliminating some of the special federal income tax provisions that disproportionately aided the nonneedy elderly. These President Bush has proposed an income-tax-based supplement for the working poor that is less costly than a refundable tax credit for children but is consistent with the approach I advocate. While he refers to his plan as "child care assistance," it is unrelated to a family's spending on child care services. Rather, it is an expanded earned income tax credit for families with children under the age of four. Like the EITC, the credit equals 14 percent of wages up to $7143, where it reaches the proposed $1000 maximum. It then remains at $1000 until wages reach $8000, after which the credit is reduced by 20 cents for each additional dollar earned, so that it phases out at $13,000. Child Care Opportunities Act (ECCO), which would both raise the maximum subsidy rate from 30 to 40 percent and make the credit refundable. Its cost is estimated at about $2.6 billion per year.
Another antipoverty strategy, the Wisconsin Child Support Assurance System (Garfinkel, 1988) or the system proposed by Lerman (1988) would target all children in single-parent families and would reduce both poverty and welfare dependency through increased parental support.
Uniform child support awards would be financed by a percentage-of-income tax on the absent parent. If this amount is less than a fixed minimum level because the absent parent's income is too low, the support payment would be supplemented up to the minimum by government funds. Because of the increased payments from absent fathers and because the system has greater work incentives for custodial mothers than does welfare,
Garfinkel estimates that such a system could be implemented with little additional government funds.
These tax-based and child support reforms together with welfare reforms for employable welfare recipients have their greatest impacts on those able to work. After these reforms have been implemented, one might consider a long-standing goal of the last two decades of welfare reform--providing a national minimum welfare benefit.
Various combinations of these and other current policy proposals, such as an increased minimum wage, extensions of medical care coverage to uninsured workers, a variety of education and training program reforms, expansion of housing assistance, and revitalized enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes, can all contribute to a renewed antipoverty effort. Again, there has been movement in some of these areas. For example, Congress has amended the Medicaid program so that some poor children are now covered even if their parents are not eligible for or do not participate in the AFDC program.
